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We use a simple ﬁnancial friction in an economy with high degree of liability
dollarization to show that the negative balance-sheet eﬀect of an exchange
rate depreciation may be observable only if the magnitude of the depreciation
is large enough. This result justiﬁes the diﬃculty to ﬁnd strong empirical
evidence for balance-sheet eﬀects and suggests the convenience of including a
"large depreciation" term in empirical analyses.
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11 Introduction
The literature on liability dollarization and currency mismatch (Krugman, 1994; Ce-
spedes et al., 2004; Choi and Cook, 2004; Magud, 2004; Batini et al., 2007; Bleakley
and Cowan, 2008; Carranza et al., 2008) has studied the balance-sheet eﬀect of ex-
change rate depreciations: when liabilities are denominated in a foreign currency, a
depreciation may lead to a reduction in ﬁrms’ net worth that contracts investment
and goes counter the traditional competitiveness eﬀect of the depreciation. This
balance-sheet eﬀe c tm a yt h e r e f o r eb ed i s i n ﬂationary and contractionary. However,
empirical analyses have found only weak evidence for this eﬀect, and usually only in
the context of quite large nominal depreciations. This empirical result suggests that
the aggregate investment function may present a nonlinearity in its dependence on
the (real) exchange rate:
∆it = I(zt)+( λ + χρ)∆et; χ = 1[∆et >ϕ ] (1)
where I(zt) contains the eﬀect of relevant variables other than the real exchange rate,
∆et is the change in the real exchange rate, λ is the sensitivity of investment to
"regular" real depreciations and ρ is the additional impact of a real depreciation that
is "large" (i.e. greater than some threshold ϕ); ﬁnally, 1[·] is an indicator function
that takes value one if the change in the real exchange rate is larger than ϕ.T h e
coeﬃcient λ may be positive or negative, since it stems from both the competitiveness
eﬀect (a real depreciation increases the output of ﬁrms that sell tradables) and the
negative impact from the increase in relative worth of foreign currency liabilities. We
argue, however, that the coeﬃcient ρ is negative. We show how a simple ﬁnancial
friction may lead to this investment function, which explains the diﬃculty in ﬁnding
2robust empirical evidence for the balance-sheet eﬀect of real depreciations. Some
recent empirical analyses (Leiderman et al., 2006; Carranza et al., 2003, 2008) seem
to give support to this nonlinear eﬀect, both in output and in aggregate prices.
2 Investment and large exchange rate deprecia-
tions
We use a simple model in the line of Bleakley and Cowan (2008). Assume a small
country with a continuum of ﬁrms that produce tradables and of ﬁr m st h a tp r o d u c e
nontradables.1 There are two periods. Firm i enters period one with some long-term
debt, which may be denominated in foreign (L∗
i)o rl o c a l( Li) currency. The ratio
L∗
i/Li is a measure of the degree of currency mismatch at the ﬁrm level, and the
aggregate ratio a measure of total liability dollarization.
We assume that short-term debt in period one, Si,1,i se q u a lt o0. For simplicity
we also assume that all short-term debt is contracted in foreign currency and the level
of long-term indebtedness is given. The real exchange rate e0 at which the foreign
debt L∗
i was contracted is equal to one and no variation is anticipated. Initial period
capital for ﬁrm i, Ki,1,i sa l s oe q u a lt o0. We assume that capital goods are imported.2
During the initial period, after an unexpected real exchange rate depreciation has
occurred (i.e., e1 > 1), ﬁrms make their investment decisions taking into account their
budget and borrowing constraints. Firm i chooses next period capital, Ki,2,a n dt h e
short term borrowing in foreign currency contracted at the initial period and payable
1Alternatively, we could think of ﬁrms producing a share of tradables and a share of nontrad-
ables. The results would be the same and we believe that keeping both separate facilitates the
interpretation.
2This assumption is not unreasonable in the case of emerging markets, which are also the main
countries that present high degrees of liability dollarization.
3at the last period, Si,2,t om a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts. Now the distinction arises between ﬁrms
that produce nontradables (i.e., their ﬂow of income is denominated in local currency)
and ﬁrms that produce tradables (i.e., their ﬂow of income can be denominated in
foreign currency). We assume that all ﬁrms are price-takers and they can sell their
whole production F(Ki,2). We thus abstract from competitiveness eﬀects of exchange
rate changes (which, in any case, would favor our argument).
2.1 Nontradable ﬁrms
The problem for a ﬁrm i that produces nontradables is:
Max{F (Ki,2) − e2L
∗
i − Li − e2rSi,2} (1)
s.t. Ki,2 ≤ Si,2 (2)
e2rSi,2 ≤ θ(F (Ki,2) − e2L
∗
i − Li) (3)
where e2 is the expected real exchange rate in the second period and r is the gross
interest rate on short term debt. Note that L∗
i and Li are contracted before the
depreciation takes place and are repayable at the last period and that we abstract
from the interest rate on long-term debt, so that L∗
i and Li can be taken as the gross
ﬁnal value repayable at the last period. Firms can borrow a fraction 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
of their necessities. The price of nontradable goods is normalized and used as a
numeraire in the second period. Given that payments and output are realized at
period two, the change in e1 must inﬂuence the level of e2. Otherwise, e1 will not
have any impact on investment decisions. Thus, we assume that the real exchange




Equation (2) is a budget constraint: new capital expenditures are ﬁnanced by
short-term borrowing. Given that short-term debt is costly, this constraint will hold
4with equality. Equation (3) is a borrowing constraint: the maximum short-term
borrowing is a fraction θ of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnal net worth. The idea behind the parameter
θ is to make explicit that credit imperfections are due to an enforcement problem:
lenders can not force their borrowers to repay their debt, but they can seize a fraction
of the borrower’s ﬁnal net worth (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, and Aghion et al.
2001).
For ﬁrms that are credit constrained (equation (3) is binding), the choice of Ki,2
depends on credit availability rather than on optimality conditions. In that case Ki,2




(F (Ki,2) − e2L
∗
i − Li) (4)
The solution to (4) is a ﬁxed point, Ki,2 = K∗ which can be represented as in
Figure 1, Panel A, where G(K)= θ
e2r (F (K) − e2L∗ − L) and I(K)=K.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
The level of Ki,2 depends not only on r but also on the net worth of ﬁrm i (given by
L∗
i and Li) and the real exchange rate, e2.W ed e n o t ei tb yKi,2 = KR
2 (r,e2;L∗
i,L i)
where R means a “restricted” ﬁrm i. It can easily be proved that an increase in
today’s real exchange rate, e1, will produce a fall in the investment of ﬁrm i.T a k i n g





e2r − θF0 (Ki,2)
(θL
∗
i + rKi,2) < 0 (6)
where the impact of a real depreciation on investment is negative because of higher
ﬁnancial costs and the balance-sheet eﬀect.3
3The ﬁrst and second derivatives of F (·) and µ(·) are denoted as F0 (·) and µ0 (·),a n dF00(·).




where investment now only depends on the interest rate and the real exchange rate,
Ki,2 = KU
2 (r,e2),a n dKU
2 stands for next period capital of the “unrestricted” ﬁrm i.
G i v e nt h a tc a p i t a li si m p o r t e d ,i ti ss t i l lt h ec a s et h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h er e a le x c h a n g e
rate causes a drop in investment (a "ﬁnancial cost" eﬀect), but this eﬀect is smaller







0 (e1) < 0 (9)
Panel B of Figure 1 shows that for a highly indebted ﬁrm, a large enough real
exchange rate depreciation (e>e ∗∗) could generate a strong negative balance-sheet
eﬀect that led to the ﬁnancial collapse of the ﬁrm: the G-curve would not intersect
the I-curve, investment collapses and the ﬁrm’s liquidation follows. In this case, a
discontinuity appears in the ﬁrm’s investment function, shown in Panel C of Figure
1.
We assume that the only diﬀerence among nontradable ﬁr m si st h e i rl e v e lo ff o r e i g n
debt L∗
i.4 Then, given the technology and institutions, there must be a critical level
L∗(e1), which depends on the real exchange rate, beyond which ﬁrms are constrained.
When a real depreciation occurs, the fraction of unconstrained ﬁr m si sr e d u c e da n d
so
dL∗(e1)
de1 < 0.L e t t i n g H (L∗) be the cumulative distribution of ﬁrms with foreign
debt less than L∗,a n dh(L∗) the density distribution function, we can obtain the
4This assumption and the parallel one that is made next in the case of tradables are merely to
avoid the double integration over the distribution of both Li and L∗
i, which would make the algebra
unnecessarily cumbersome and would add no insight.


























































1 will depend on H(L∗), but it will most likely be negative, so that
al a r g ec h a n g ei nt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ec o u l di m p l yal a r g en e g a t i v ec h a n g ei nt h e
derivative of investment with respect to e1.
2.2 Tradable ﬁrms
For a ﬁrm producing tradables, we assume that the revenues are given in foreign
currency and so ﬁrm i’s problem becomes:
Max{e2F (Ki,2) − e2L
∗
i − Li − e2rSi,2} (12)
s.t. Ki,2 ≤ Si,2 (13)
e2rSi,2 ≤ θ(e2F (Ki,2) − e2L
∗
i − Li) (14)

















where the solution is a ﬁxed point Ki,2 = KR
2 (r,e2;L∗
i,L i) that depends on r,o nt h e
net worth of ﬁrm i (given by L∗
i and Li) and the real exchange rate e2. Now, however,
7an increase in the real exchange rate e1 produces an increase in investment, since the
relative value of domestic debt falls with respect to the value of revenues and the net






2 [r − θF0 (Ki,2)]
> 0 (16)
If ﬁrms are not constrained, equation (14) is not binding and the solution is:
F
0 (Ki,2)=r (17)
where investment Ki,2 = KU
2 (r) only depends on the interest rate and therefore its




Thus, the investment function of a tradable ﬁrm looks like that on Panel D of
Figure 1, where we allow for a massive appreciation to cause a tradable ﬁrm’s bank-
ruptcy. Assuming that the only diﬀerence among tradable ﬁr m si st h e i rl e v e lo f
domestic debt Li, there is also in this case a critical level L(e1), a function of the real
exchange rate, beyond which tradable ﬁrms are constrained. Now, however, when a
real appreciation occurs, the fraction of unconstrained ﬁrms is reduced and therefore
dL(e1)
de1 > 0. Letting F (L) be the cumulative distribution of tradable ﬁrms with do-
mestic debt less than L,a n df (L) be the density distribution function, we obtain the
















i,L i)dF (L) (19)























8which is positive given that both terms in (20) are positive.
If we now calculate aggregate investment It = IT
t + INT
t as a function of the real
e x c h a n g er a t e ,w em a yo b t a i naf u n c t i o ns u c ha st h a ti nF i g u r e2 ,w h i c hc a nb e
linearized around e0 and e00 to obtain a linear aggregate investment function with a
kink of the form in equation (1).5 Notice that λ may be negative or positive: the
negative balance-sheet eﬀect for small depreciations in the nontradable sector may not
be enough to compensate the competitiveness plus positive balance-sheet eﬀects in
the tradable sector. This does not aﬀect our main result that, when the depreciation
is large there will appear a stronger negative eﬀect, so that ρ<0 for sure. In other
words, the ﬁrst section of It may be increasing or decreasing on the real exchange rate
(λ>0 or λ<0, respectively) but eventually, for a large enough e, the function will
be decreasing or, at least, ﬂatter because of ρ<0 (ﬂat IT




The coeﬃcient ρ measures the magnitude of this "large depreciation" balance-
sheet eﬀect. From the model it can be seen that this magnitude depends:
- Positively on the degree of currency mismatch (liability dollarization) of the
economy. In fact, both λ and ρ are functions of the level of liability dollarization:
the negative balance-sheet in nontradables is more intense the larger L∗
i is -regardless
of Li- and the positive balance-sheet eﬀect in tradables is less intense the larger L∗
i
compared to Li.
5The speciﬁcs h a p eo fIt —whether it has an upward sloping part or a downward sloping part—
depends on both H(L∗) and F(L). The main point here is that the slope for large values of the real
exchange rate is lower than that for small values, which implies that ρ<0.
9- Negatively on the proportion of tradables in the composition of output.
- Positively on the level of indebtedness of the country’s ﬁrms, denoted here by
the distributions H(L∗) and F(L).
- Positively on the extent of the ﬁnancial friction, here denoted by θ.T h i sf r i c t i o n ,
in turn, depends on factors such as the country’s legal framework -the extent to which
repayment of credit contracts can be enforced- and the strength of the banking sector:
banks with stronger balance-sheets or with less currency mismatch in their balance
sheets will tend to lend more.
3C o n c l u s i o n
Our results are relevant to extend the empirical literature on the eﬀects of depre-
ciations for emerging markets, which present both high degrees of dollarization and
large exchange rate swings (Bigio and Salas, 2006; Goujon, 2006; Leiderman et al.,
2006; Ca’Zorzi et al., 2007). We have sho w nt h a ti nas m a l lo p e ne c o n o m yw i t h
currency mismatch (liability dollarization) the presence of a simple ﬁnancial friction
not only generates a traditional balance-sheet eﬀect of a real depreciation, but also
a possible "large depreciation" eﬀect. This eﬀect may lead to a kink in the invest-
ment/real exchange rate function so that it becomes downward sloping or, at least,
its positive slope is signiﬁcantly reduced. The result suggests that contractionary
balance-sheet eﬀects could be empirically noteworthy only in the presence of large
enough depreciations.
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